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MAKING THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR PLANNING 
 
David Adams (University of Glasgow) and Craig Watkins (University of Sheffield) 
 
For almost four decades, professional planners in the UK have experienced a sustained political 
attack on their endeavours, primarily but not exclusively from a right-wing direction. The 
essence of this attack is that planning serves to undermine and restrict economic growth and 
prosperity. One of the earliest claims was made by Michael Heseltine in 1979 and repeated by 
him more than thirty years later when he wrote that: “Nowhere else can the pedestrian speed 
of decision making in this country – and its effects – be more damaging than in planning. There 
are countless jobs tied up in the filing cabinets of the planning machine” (Heseltine, 2012: 110). 
This sentiment was subsequently echoed by the UK Government in its 2015 productivity plan 
entitled Fixing the Foundations which it suggested would address “particular challenges in the 
form of a planning system regarded by many as one of the most significant constraints facing 
the economy, bringing delay and inflexibility” (HM Treasury, 2015: 41). 
 
If such attacks were motivated entirely by political hostility to the concept of planning, they 
might be more readily dismissed. But over the past two decades, some highly-respected urban 
and housing economists have been working away to establish what they see as the costs of 
planning intervention. Numerous peer-reviewed papers on the costs of planning have now been 
published in many leading journals, looking not simply as the UK but at other jurisdictions 
such as Hong Kong and the USA. Arguably, the most high-profile academic team to have 
concentrated in depth on the costs of planning is that led by Professor Paul Cheshire at the 
London School of Economics. In an important 2012 summary of their case, this team contended 
that: “Specifically, there is evidence that the UK planning system: increases house prices and 
reduces housing quality (with a regressive impact on low to middle income families), increases 
housing market volatility, increases office rents, lowers retail productivity, lowers employment 
in small independent retailers, (and) may not properly assess the true social costs of brownfield 
versus greenfield development” (Cheshire et al, 2012: abstract). 
 
These are serious charges indeed, especially since such academic critiques of planning feed 
off, and feed into, evident political hostility. Surprisingly, however, until recently neither the 
planning profession nor the planning academy did much to counter these claims. In a phrase 
coined by Campbell (2008), this put both in the dangerous position of ‘leaving economics to 
economists.’ Of course, few planning academics or indeed planning practitioners come from 
an economics background, with the result that most debates in planning theory are dominated 
by sociological or governance perspectives, and engage very little with concerns around the 
costs and benefits of planning. It is therefore much to the credit of the Royal Town Planning 
Institute, as both a professional body and a learned society, that it has recently been at the 
forefront of encouraging a new programme of research into the value of planning, to which we 
and others have contributed (see Adams and Watkins, 2014; Adams et al., 2016, Lord et al., 
2015, Wu et al., 2015). 
 
As a first step to providing a more balanced account of the costs and benefits of planning, this 
initial work will hopefully encourage much greater curiosity and pluralist empirical enquiry 
from social science academics about the case for planning and its wider economic and social 
ramifications. Such research may well be essential if planning is to survive professionally (and 
maybe even academically) in the UK since without the necessary intellectual framework, it 
becomes much harder to resist political attacks on the validity of planning. In the remainder of 
this note, we therefore summarise the thinking around planning, markets and economics that 
we developed in the RTPI work and which we hope will encourage further intellectual 
creativity in identifying the value generated by planning. 
 
Since value is a multi-dimensional concept, it is important neither to restrict the value of 
planning to economic and financial factors, nor exclude them from analysis. Drawing on 
Macmillan (2006), we might expect planning at its most effective to enhance some combination 
of exchange, use, social, environmental, image and cultural value. Conversely, when at its least 
effective, planning may well detract from such values. While the first two of these types of 
value are clearly economic in nature, we do not consider the other four to be necessarily non-
financial, nor do we see any dichotomy between economic value and other types of value. We 
make this point because we do not concur with the view that recent research into the value of 
planning is over-focused on the economic to the detriment of other types of value (Davoudi, 
2016). Rather, the kind of places where people really want to live, work and invest create all 
kinds of value which often find expression in economic terms. However, we certainly do not 
take an uncritical view of economic growth. Instead, we see long-term sustainable economic 
growth as more likely to result from planned interventions than from their absence. 
 
As well as opening up what is meant by concepts such as ‘value’ and ‘growth’, it is essential 
to challenge the narrowness of economic analysis that deliberately restricts planning to a 
particular type of development regulation. This restrictive approach is the first key weakness 
of the arguments deployed by Paul Cheshire and colleagues, which sets up the ‘straw man’ of 
planning as merely some kind of regulatory mechanism to determine whether particular 
development proposals should be approved or not, before proceeding to the relatively easy task 
of then knocking it down. Planning is much more complex than the simple model adopted by 
Cheshire et al., and it behoves all those who wish to undertake serious economic analysis of its 
costs and benefits, to reflect this. Our approach has been to think conceptually about the 
interaction between planning and real estate markets and to develop a conceptualisation that 
includes not only market regulation, but also market shaping, market stimulus and capacity-
building as essential elements of planning (see Adams and Tiesdell, 2013, for a fuller 
discussion of each of categories). Any rounded economic analysis of the impact of planning 
must therefore extend to shaping instruments, such as strategic plans, and stimulus instruments, 
such as town centre management, and should not simply concentrate analytical attention on 
regulatory instruments such as development control. 
 
The second key weakness of the approach taken by Paul Cheshire and colleagues ironically 
lies in their very narrow view of economics itself. In our research, we compare five different 
philosophical perspectives in economics, all of which have potential to enlighten our 
understanding of the relationship between planning and real estate markets. Most of the 
analytical work on the economic costs of planning, including that by the Cheshire team is set 
the first of these - the neo-classical perspective, which essentially explores how far planning 
directly affects the overall quantity of market supply, demand and price. Even here, attention 
has been over-concentrated on the supply side to the relative neglect of the demand side. 
Crucially, it is important to acknowledge the planning interventions may boost demand, rather 
than simply restrict supply (see Jackson and Watkins, 2011). For example, if house buyers are 
interested not simply in the qualities of the house itself but in those of the neighbourhood in 
which the house is located, then it becomes much it becomes much too simplistic to see house 
price rises simply as the costs of planning since they may equally reflect higher demand in 
well-planned areas. 
 
This essential requirement to develop a more mature understanding of the value of planning 
from within the neo-classical perspective is matched by an urgent need to branch out into at 
least four other important economic perspectives. So drawing on welfare economics, for 
example, we might ask how far planning can overcome market failure. Here, a substantial body 
of work grounded in welfare economics has long explained how planning can improve 
economic efficiency by tackling market failure in land and property (see, for example, Evans, 
2004; Klosterman, 1985). Moving on to new institutional economics, we might ask how far 
planning reduces or, indeed, increases, market transaction costs. Here, Webster and Lai (2003) 
contrast markets as institutions that potentially reduce individual transaction costs with 
government policies and regulations that potentially reduce collective transaction costs.  
 
From a behavioural economics perspective, we might ask how far planning can nudge markets 
towards more beneficial outcomes. In this context, development plans and development control 
processes may actually be quite efficient in signalling potential outcomes to market 
participants. Their behavioural effect might indeed be positive as well as negative, creating 
anchors that encourage greater interest among developers in potential opportunities as well as 
deterring wasted expenditure in pursuing projects unlikely to meet with approval (Ferrari et al, 
2011). If the case for democratic management of land use is accepted in principle, then it can 
be argued that an effective planning system conserves economic resources by advance 
signalling of likely outcomes. 
 
Increasingly, drawing on the social construction of markets, we might ask also how far 
planning can transform market cultures and practices. For example, in many regeneration areas, 
planning has long been at the forefront of what Healey (1992) describes as the activity of 
‘creating markets’ through strategic development or regeneration frameworks that use public-
sector vision and investment to rescue weak local property markets, so breeding confidence 
and co-ordination among private landowners and developers. One of the main limitations of 
econometric forms of analysis that reduce planning to development regulation in order to 
measure just its costs is that they fail to pick up on this broader activity and thus seem unable 
to acknowledge some of the real benefits of planning. It is scant defence to argue that much of 
this activity falls beyond whatever constitutes the currently statutory or legal definition of 
planning when conceptually market stimulus is as much part of planning activity as market 
regulation or market shaping. 
 
Once we recognise the breadth and scope of economic analysis, it becomes striking how 
narrowly based are the particular economic critiques of planning that seem to have been unduly 
influential among right-wing politicians. Yet, even within their neo-classical framework, 
Cheshire et al. are unduly dependent on the theory of perfect competition which has little in 
common with the reality of the land and housing markets in which they most interested. This 
is the third key weakness of their approach and is particularly strange since those now at the 
forefront of neo-classical analysis increasingly regard the conditions of perfect competition as 
a benchmark against which departures can be measured, rather than an essential prerequisite of 
analysis. 
 
Take, for example, the structure and behaviour of the UK housebuilding industry, dominated 
as it is by relatively few large firms, which ensures that monopolistic not perfect competition 
exists in housebuilding. As recent research has thus clearly shown (Archer and Cole, 2016), in 
markets where demand is rising and there is upward pressure on prices, volume housebuilders 
will prioritise profit growth above volume growth. Alongside well-known skills and capacity 
constraints in the housebuilding sector, this makes it naïve to attribute all supply constraints to 
the planning system. Yet, most mainstream models do exactly this, making little effort to take 
account of market structure or capacity constraints attributable to labour and skills shortages. 
This technical weakness means that their supply equations are often under-specified and fail to 
capture negative impacts associated with a host of unmeasured constraints. In short, some of 
the costs they blame on the planning system arise elsewhere. 
  
While Cheshire et al. (2012: 4) claim that their approach represents “a considerable 
underestimate of the true costs of planning” the theoretical and methodological weaknesses 
inherent in their analysis probably mean that, in our view, the reverse is more likely to be true. 
Despite this, the hard numbers generated by such work seem to captivate political attention and 
attract popular headlines, irrespective of any conceptual or technical limits to the analysis. 
Planning must now work hard to create an alternative economic discourse, drawing on the 
fuller range of economic perspectives, which accurately demonstrates the added value of 
planned intervention in real estate market. 
 
The theory of collective action can provide an important theoretical foundation here since it 
focuses on whether and how the whole exceeds the value of the sum of the parts. In this context, 
an important component of the economic case for planning derives from its potential to produce 
complex but integrated forms of development, where otherwise disintegration might be rife 
between one site and next, between the public and private realms, between the additional 
infrastructure requirements generated by development and their actual provision, and crucially 
between the present and future. In short, it is quite possible to articulate a strong theoretical 
case that the economic benefits of planning are likely to exceed its costs, but we need a lot 
more detailed research to substantiate this claim with hard evidence (Adams et al, 2016). This 
must be an important task for the planning academy in the years to come. And the results may 
cause us to reflect on what style of planning is most likely to generate those benefits and thus 
influence practice accordingly. 
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